Trends in Racial Attitudes
Trends in Racial Attitudes
How do people feel about race?
For those who believe we live in a post-racial society, this question may seem simple. Although survey data collected since the 1940s do show that racial attitudes held by whites and African Americans have changed, that change is much more complicated than generally assumed. As state and federal policies have been adopted to battle racial inequality—from the desegregation of schools to preventing housing discrimination to affirmative action—there have been changes in some aspects of the nation’s racial climate. But has there been universal change in the hearts and minds of Americans? The answer to this question in complex.
This website compiles the results of several national surveys that have been tracking Americans’ racial attitudes from as early as the 1940s up until today. The focus is on data that can shed light on trends. The researchers include questions that have been repeated at least three times, spanning at least 10 years. The surveys measure white and African American attitudes on racial equality, government efforts to ensure equal treatment, affirmative action, preferred social contact with racial groups, and other topics for which trend data are available. Unfortunately, questions of and about Latinos have not been asked regularly in the national surveys that are available. Therefore, our portrait is limited to African American and white respondents.
Looking at the historical data, one conclusion is consistent and strong: racial attitudes are complex. Take a closer look at the patterns and trends for more detailed topics and survey questions by browsing the menu to the left.
Read a general summary of the findings:
"A Portrait of African American and White Racial Attitudes"
For more information about this website's content, contact Maria Krysan.
The data here build on a book published in 1997 titled Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations, Revised Edition, by Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, and Maria Krysan (Harvard University Press).
Cite this research as follows:
Krysan, M., & Moberg, S. (2016, August 25). Trends in racial attitudes. University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs. Retrieved from http://igpa.uillinois.edu/programs/racial-attitudes
Principles of Equality
Implementation of Equal Treatment
Affirmative Action
Explaining Racial Inequality
Perceptions of Discrimination and Stereotyping
Endorsement of Racial Stereotypes
Social Distance
Miscellaneous Questions
About the Researchers
References
White Attitudes
Click to enlarge graph in new window
One of the most substantial changes in white racial attitudes has been the movement from very substantial opposition to the principle of racial equality to one of almost universal support. For example, in 1942, just 32 percent of whites agreed that whites and blacks should attend the same schools; in 1995, when the question was last asked, 96 percent of whites agreed. In 1944, only 45 percent of whites agreed that blacks should have “as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job,” but by 1972 almost all whites agreed with this statement on equal opportunity (97 percent). Finally, in a question that taps whites’ feelings about a black person holding the highest office in the U.S., Gallup found that in 1958, only 37 percent of whites said they would vote for a black candidate for president; by 1997 that figure was up to 95 percent.
What is revealing is that many of the survey questions that tap attitudes toward the principle of equality are no longer included on major national surveys; they have become essentially universally accepted by whites and therefore not deemed as worth asking on surveys. The only “principle” question that continues to be asked is whether there should be laws against interracial marriage: by the mid-1990s, 87 percent of whites opposed such laws, and opposition inched up to 90 percent by 2002. These levels reflect considerable long-term change: in 1963, only 38 percent of whites opposed laws against interracial marriage (which means, of course, that 62 percent supported such laws). A similar question from Gallup about general approval of interracial marriage also shows a large increase in approval: from 51 percent in 1991 to 86 percent in 2011 (see Figure 1 (W) above).
If these were the only available data on racial attitudes, we would conclude that whites are almost universal in their racial liberalism. But racial attitudes are a multi-dimensional concept, and this pattern of improvement does not hold across all kinds of questions. For example, one of the central conclusions from the survey record on white racial attitudes is that in contemporary American society, whites are more likely to support the principle of racial equality than they are to support either the implementation of equality or policies that would take more affirmative steps to redress past or persistent discrimination (See Implementation of Equal Treatment and Affirmative Action sections for details.)
Black Attitudes
Click to enlarge graph in new window
African Americans have consistently shown almost universal support for the principles of racial equality, including integrated schools and housing rights. And since the first time the question was asked of African Americans in a survey, there has been universal support for a black candidate for president. The few questions on principles of racial equality that are still included in surveys show little change simply because they had already reached their maximum; the only one with any change is a question on interracial marriage (see Figure 1 (B) above). As has been the case since 1982, over 90 percent of African Americans oppose laws against interracial marriage. Whites, as noted earlier, are closing this gap – as of 2002, 90 percent of whites also oppose such laws. African Americans report high levels of general approval of interracial marriage, with 97 percent approval in 2011, compared with 86 percent of whites. However, this question shows an increase in approval over the past couple of decades – from 77 percent approval to 97 percent in 2011. The difference in support for legal rights to intermarriage versus general support of interracial marriage during the 1980s and 1990s might reflect the distinction between equal rights and integration. While African Americans consistently report very strong support for equal rights and access, this is not necessarily connected to a desire for greater integration in social settings, although the two might often be related. However, at this point, the two different questions on interracial marriage—one in terms of support and the other in terms of the legality of it—both show nearly universal support.
Download detailed results
Questions Concerning Principles of Racial Equality, White Respondents
(.xlsx, 44.81 KB)
Questions Concerning Principles of Racial Equality, Black Respondents
(.xlsx, 38.08 KB)
White Attitudes
Click to enlarge graph in new window
The clear trend toward more liberal racial attitudes in terms of the principles of racial equality (See Principles of Equality section) is not matched when the question becomes one of support for the implementation of the principle of equality. Whites are less willing to endorse action—at the local or federal level—to ensure the principle of equality than they are to support the abstract principle. The survey record has questions about implementation in a variety of settings: schools, jobs, housing, and accommodations such as restaurants and hotels.
Whites have been asked about their support for the federal government’s role in ensuring that black and white children go to the same schools and that blacks are treated fairly in jobs and have the right to “go to any hotel or restaurant they can afford.” In the case of all three of these questions, the highest level of support for federal government intervention was in the late 1960s and early 1970s (See Figure 2 (W) above). Only the question of government intervention in ensuring equal accommodations enjoyed a clear increase in support, from 44 percent in 1964 to its peak of 65 percent in 1974. Although this dipped to 56 percent in 1995, the last year it was asked, a majority of whites still supported it.
Enjoying lower levels of support and more erratic trends are questions about intervention in schools and jobs: between 1964 and 1970, about 40 percent of whites thought the federal government should intervene in the workplace. But starting in the mid-1970s, outright support for federal involvement in this area declined. Declines also occurred in the area of schools, particularly between 1970 and 1976. While 42 percent of whites supported federal intervention in schools in 1964, and almost half of whites expressed support in 1968, by 1976, only 21 percent of whites supported government intervention in schools. Whites become somewhat more favorable to government "seeing to it" during the 1990s, but at the last time point in 2000, it was a minority (31 percent) who supported federal government intervention in ensuring that blacks and whites go to the same schools. This trend is probably due in part to the fact that in the early 1970s, court-ordered busing was introduced to reduce the de facto segregation of schools. During this time, it is likely that this generic question about school intervention was equated in many people’s minds with the more specific practice of busing—a policy that was overwhelmingly opposed by whites. For example, in 1972, when a question about busing was first asked by NORC, only 13 percent of whites supported the practice. This increased to 33 percent by 1996, but this increase in support (and trends in the general school implementation question) are likely due to the decreased salience of the topic and the disappearance of many busing policies.
Click to enlarge the graph in a new window
One of the most interesting trends in the implementation questions is the increase in the “no interest” response (see Figure 3 (W) above). As support declined for federal intervention during the 1980s and 1990s, only about one out of three whites thought the government should “see to it” that blacks and whites are treated equally in schools and jobs. Whites reported their lowest levels of support for federal intervention in jobs in 2008 (23 percent). However, this does not reflect an increase in those saying the government should “stay out.” Rather, whites increasingly decline to state a position—instead indicating that they “have not been concerned or interested enough about it to favor one side over the other” (see Figure 2 (W) above). The trend for this question may reflect a pattern of increasing “racial apathy,” which is an indifference to racial inequality (Forman, 2004). Alternatively, whites may increasingly use the “no interest” response as a way to avoid stating a clear position on the issue: social desirability pressures may lead white respondents to decline to answer, rather than give an answer that may be interpreted as racially conservative (Berinsky, 1999).
An implementation question about housing, however, shows a different trend—perhaps in part because there is not an explicit ‘no interest’ response. There is a continuing trend toward increasing support for laws that say a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color (see Figure 2 (W) above). In 1972, just one out of three whites supported this law; by the early 1990s, this had grown to about two out of three and has since increased to 71 percent in 2014. It is noteworthy that this question, unlike the others in this section, focuses on a community-wide vote, rather than federal intervention.
How can we make sense of these different trends? There is no clear answer, but a few things are worth considering. First, the decline in support for federal intervention in jobs and education may reflect changes in attitudes about the role of government among whites. Whites expressed the highest level of support for government intervention in these areas during the same period that survey data reported higher levels of negative racial stereotypes and segregation in private and public spaces. Therefore, it is possible that a decrease in support for intervention reflects changes in whether whites identify inequality as a problem, or whether they identify government involvement as a viable solution. By contrast, the increase in support for an open housing law poses another set of questions. Does the higher level of support for this item reflect a preference for local governance? Or does the narrow focus of the question avoid raising concerns about what types of policies or funding would be needed for the proposed government action? The open housing law question is clearly more circumscribed in its purpose, as opposed to questions about the government’s obligation to ensure fair and equal treatment in schools and jobs. As Krysan (1999) notes, the "fair treatment" in jobs is vague enough to be interpreted in any number of ways.
In general, though, apart from these nuanced differences across types of implementation, this set of questions makes it clear that whites are more willing to support the principles of equality than commit resources to its implementation.
Black Attitudes
Click to enlarge graph in new window
Click to enlarge graph in a new window
The gap between support for principles and for their implementation has always been narrower for African Americans than for whites—though it is worth noting that the gap nevertheless exists. In addition, whites and African Americans show a similar trend in terms of a decline in the attitude that the government should “see to it” that racial equality comes about, and a concomitant increase in saying that they have “no interest” in the question. To be sure, African Americans have higher levels of support than whites for the government’s role in ensuring, for example, that black and white children go to the same schools. But that support has declined in recent years (see Figure 2 (B) above). In 2000, support had dropped to just 50 percent—compared to a high of 90 percent in 1968. Again, it is not that African Americans now feel that it is “not the government’s business;” rather, there is a growth in those indicating they “do not have enough concern or interest” to favor one side over the other (see Figure 3 (B) above).
Interestingly, when the question is about ensuring fair treatment in jobs, there is stronger support—though, again, with some evidence of a decline in support for government involvement and an increase in the “no interest” response (see Figure 2 (B) and Figure 3(B) above). In 1964, 92 percent of African Americans supported federal government intervention in jobs, which fell to 59 percent support in 2008. As noted in the summary on whites’ attitudes, there has been a decline in support for federal job intervention and increasing disinterest. But although the trend over time is similar, African Americans started with and continue to report much greater support than whites: whites’ support peaked in 1972 at 40 percent and has since dropped to 23 percent in 2008. Although African Americans continue to show greater support, the drop from near universal to majority support is a significant change, which raises questions about what the increasing response of “no interest” means for both African Americans and whites. Does this decline for both groups reflect changes in attitudes towards the role of government? Is it possible that the white backlash against government efforts to reduce inequality, as seen in the reactionary politics of the Reagan era, has contributed to a mistrust of government among both whites and blacks for resolving these issues?
Despite the decline in support for federal government intervention in these two areas of life, a community-wide vote on equal access to housing continues to show strong and steady support: in 2014, as has been true since the mid-1970s, over three-quarters of African Americans supported a law that says homeowners cannot discriminate on the basis of race when selling their homes (see Figure 2 (B) above). Although whites also show high levels of support for this law in recent years, African Americans still have more than a 10 percent lead on whites in 2014 (83 percent and 71 percent, respectively). The gap in levels of support between federal and local measures is also much larger for whites than for blacks. Whereas whites never showed overwhelming support for federal intervention in jobs and schools, African Americans reported higher levels of support for federal intervention in the 1960s than they showed for the local housing measure when it was first asked in the 1970s. Therefore, attitudes towards federal and local government interventions seem to follow different patterns for whites and blacks during the last half of the twentieth century, although both groups show a decline in support for federal intervention since the 1970s.
Download detailed results
White Attitudes
Click to enlarge graph in new window
While support for the implementation of the principle of equality (See the Implementation of Equality section) is clearly lower than that for the principles themselves (See the Principles of Equality section), the gap between principles and policies is even greater when looking at more affirmative policies. There are two categories of questions in this section—one about the level of government expenditures on problems faced by African Americans and the other about preferential treatment for blacks in hiring and promotion. Levels of support for these two broad categories of government action are generally lower than support for either the principles or the implementation questions reviewed in the other sections (see Figure 4 (W) above). As the tables suggest, and the figures reinforce (see Figure 5 (W) below), most of the questions on affirmative action measures show no clear trends since the 1970s, although recently there is a slight decrease in support for the government’s role in improving the social and economic conditions of blacks. This is in line with the trends in the implementation questions (see the Implementation of Equal Treatment section).
Regarding government expenditures, white respondents show general support for the “status quo,” and there has been no major change over the past 40 or so years. For example, since 2000, over half of whites believed the current level of spending to “improve the conditions of blacks” is about right. In nearly every survey year from 1973 to 2014, less than one third of whites responded that the government spent “too little” on improving the conditions of blacks. A related question from ISR shows a similar pattern, although “increasing spending” became less popular in the early 2000s, when this question was last asked.
Two questions ask whether the government has a special obligation to generally improve the social and economic conditions of blacks, without explicitly mentioning funding (see Figure 5 (W) above). One asks whether the government should help blacks or if instead there should be no “special treatment” (NORC). Less than one quarter of whites agreed that the government had an obligation to improve the lives of blacks across the entire time period of both items, with the earliest item asked in 1975. There has been a slight and slow decline in whites reporting that the government should help (2012: ISR item – 12 percent support; 2014: NORC item – 10 percent support).
Whites express the lowest level of support for policies that involve preferential treatment of blacks. The majority of whites opposed policies giving blacks preference in admission to colleges through the early 1990s when this question was last asked. This type of policy came under serious legal attack starting with the California referendum against affirmative action in 1996. Since the questions were first asked in the mid-1980s, whites have also expressed low levels of support for preferences in hiring and promotion for blacks. Whites express the lowest support in response to questions that mention the counter-arguments that preferential treatment would be given to blacks who “haven’t earned” the job rewards or that it would lead to discrimination against whites (see Figure 5 (W) above).
One last insight into white attitudes toward affirmative action comes from a question that only recently became available as a time series. The data already reported show that affirmative action in general, and preferences in hiring and promotion in particular, are unpopular policies among whites. However, in addition to asking about support for the policy, from 1990 to 2012, respondents were asked about the extent to which they believed that a white person was likely to be denied a job when an equally or less qualified black person got it instead. In 1990, 29 percent of whites believed this was “very likely” to happen, while another 42 percent thought it was somewhat likely. The trend suggests the perception of the existence of reverse discrimination has generally declined: in 2014, just 16 percent said it was very likely to happen while 48 percent said it was “somewhat likely.”
What we know about white attitudes toward affirmative action is severely limited because there is little variety in the survey questions that have been asked over time. The specificity of the program, the type of policy (preferences versus quotas versus economic aid versus job training and educational assistance), and the target (women or blacks or minorities) can all impact the level of support. For example, on the one hand, Steeh and Krysan (1996) report, when the wording of the question starkly contrasts abilities with preferential treatment based on race, fewer than 10 percent of whites favored a race-based policy (in the late 1970s and early 1990s). On the other hand, for questions that specifically clarify that the program would not include rigid quotas, support is much higher. In 1988, for example, fully 73 percent of whites favored affirmative action when the question mentioned explicitly that the proposed program did not involve quotas. These contrasting figures give a hint of the complexity of attitudes toward affirmative action; a complexity not obvious because the survey questions ask only about a few specific kinds of policies or about very general issues of “government spending.”
Black Attitudes
Click to enlarge graph in new window
Turning to questions that ask about more affirmative steps toward addressing racial inequality, focusing first on government expenditures, there has been no significant change in African American attitudes, although there has been a very slight decline in support since the 1980s. As with whites, there is a gap between support for principles of equality and policies for addressing inequality. However, the gap is much smaller for African Americans, since the majority of African Americans express support for government intervention to ensure equal access (see the Implementation of Equality section). Also, unlike whites, African Americans show much stronger support for policies requiring greater government expenditure and affirmative action to address racial inequalities (see Figure 4 (B) above).
For questions regarding affirmative policies, the modal response of African Americans has always been that the government is not doing enough. In 2014, 75 percent of African Americans indicated that the government was spending “too little” to improve the conditions of blacks. But two questions that ask if the government should help blacks do show a slight decline in support over time (see Figure 5 (B) below). For example, just over one third of African Americans in 2012 thought the government should help blacks (as opposed to blacks helping themselves). This is substantially higher than the levels for white respondents (12 percent in 2012)—and shows little change since it was first asked in 1986. However, if we compare the results to a similar, earlier one that asked about “aid to minorities” instead of “aid to blacks,” we see a decline in African Americans’ support for government involvement in the past 40 years, since in 1970, while 78 percent of African Americans supported government aid to minorities, this declined until the question was scrapped in favor of the question on aid to blacks. Additionally, a NORC question that places government assistance in the context of overcoming the effects of discrimination also reveals a trend toward less government involvement. From 1975 to 2014, the percentage who indicated that the government should help blacks dropped from 67 percent to 43 percent.
Click to enlarge graph in new window
One of the most substantial racial differences in race-related attitudes in the contemporary era is the question of attitudes toward preferential treatment based on race. For the most part, such policies receive very little support from whites, which has not changed substantially over time. Although support among African Americans for preferences in hiring and promotion is by no means universal, African Americans consistently report very high levels of support, and much higher than whites. There has been some decline in this support since the 1980s (Figure 4 (B), above): an ISR question on hiring and promotion showed that 67 percent of African Americans favor preferential treatment (“strongly and “not strongly”) in 1986, whereas 53 percent favor it in 2012. A similar question from NORC showed declines in support from 55 percent in 1994 to 38 percent in 2014. This pattern reflects the broader trend of a decline in African Americans’ support for government intervention to address racial inequalities, although it is still much greater than whites’ support across all of these items.
Download detailed results
Questions Concerning Affirmative Action, White Respondents
(.xlsx, 33.14KB)
Questions Concerning Affirmative Action, Black Respondents
(.xlsx, 33.05KB)
White Attitudes
In the past few decades, there has been increasing interest in understanding how people explain current racial inequality because often it is a key indicator of whether someone will support race-targeted policies like those discussed in the Affirmative Action section (e.g., Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Specifically, whites who explain inequality in structural terms—focusing on the existence of discrimination, for example—are more likely to support race-based policies.
A second reason explanations for inequality is an important dimension of racial attitudes has to do with the shift in racial prejudice away from the biological foundations and strict segregation of the Jim Crow era, toward the more contemporary era, characterized by a denial of the existence of race-based discrimination, persistent negative stereotypes focused on the idea that blacks violate cherished American values, and a belief in cultural—rather than biological—differences between racial groups. This constellation of beliefs, including but not limited to explanations for racial inequality, is the cornerstone of a new contemporary racial ideology, which has been variously labeled “colorblind racism,” “symbolic racism,” “modern racism,” “racial resentment,” and “laissez faire racism” (Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Henry and Sears 2002; McConahay 1986; Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000).
Click to enlarge graph in new window
Beginning in the mid-1970s, survey researchers began to ask questions that tap into some of the key dimensions of this new ideology. In 1977, NORC started to ask respondents whether they thought each of four different reasons could explain why “blacks, on average, have worse jobs, income, and housing than whites”: discrimination, inborn ability to learn, education, and motivation (see Figure 6 (W) above). As Figure 6 shows, through the 1990s, fewer whites agreed with each of the four explanations. In addition, agreement with each reason has remained at a relatively constant level since the mid-2000s.
This overall decreased endorsement of all four explanations reflects a waning belief among whites in both biological (inborn ability to learn) and structural (education and discrimination) explanations of racial inequality. The most popular explanation refers to a cultural consideration: that blacks lack the necessary motivation and willpower to succeed. Although it continues to be the modal explanation given by whites, as with other explanations, there has been a decline in its popularity. In 2014, 43 percent of whites agreed that inequality was due to lack of motivation and willpower, which was only 2 percentage points more than the percentage of whites who agreed that inequality was due to unequal access to education (41 percent).
Click to enlarge graph in new window
Results for two ISR questions on the effects of discrimination and the role of motivation in explaining inequality show a similar trend (see Figure 7 (W) above). In 1972, 72 percent of whites agreed that “generations of slavery and discrimination” make it difficult for blacks to move up the economic ladder, and 69 percent agreed that blacks should “try harder” in order to be “as well off as whites.” Fewer whites agreed with these statements over the next four decades, although the decline was greater for the discrimination argument. In 2012, only 46 percent of whites agreed with the discrimination explanation, while 65 percent agreed with the motivation explanation. (Note: Due to changes in the wording of these questions, trend comparisons are based on the assumption that respondents would be proportionally distributed if the middle answer option of “neither agree nor disagree” was not offered in any year.)
The declining popularity of structural and biological explanations of inequality is consistent with the transition from Jim Crow to more contemporary racial ideologies. However, the declining endorsement of the cultural explanation is unexplained by these theories. One possibility is that an altogether different explanation has become salient in the contemporary racial climate—one that we have yet to include in survey questions. Another possibility is that social desirability pressures—which are always of concern on questions that are sensitive—are at work. It may be that this explanation is viewed as increasingly inappropriate to admit to a survey interviewer in a contemporary climate of “colorblind” ideology (Forman, 2004). This trend may also show whites’ decreasing attention to race in American society—that is, the rise of “racial apathy” (Forman, 2004).
Whites’ attitudes have stagnated on a variety of racial issues over the past couple of decades, including their explanations of inequality, endorsement of racial stereotypes, and perceptions of discrimination in different social venues (see Perceptions of Discrimination and Stereotypes section). Whites are also less interested in responding to questions about how the government could help reduce persistent racial inequalities. This combination of disinterest and stagnation in whites’ racial attitudes raises questions about how these attitudes are formed and what it means for the future of addressing racial inequality in American society.
Black Attitudes
Click to enlarge graph in new window
From 1985 to 1994, around 80 percent of African Americans agreed that discrimination was a cause of racial inequality (range: 75 to 83 percent). Although there have been some fluctuations, endorsement of this reason declined starting in 1996, and has hovered ever since between a small majority and two thirds of African Americans. Nevertheless, despite this downturn, discrimination remains African Americans’ most frequently endorsed explanation for racial inequality in 2014 (60 percent) (see Figure 6 (B) above).
Similarly, there have been declines in the percentage of African Americans who explain inequality in terms of a lack of access to education, the other structurally based cause of racial inequality included in the survey: from a high of 75 percent in 1985, to just under 50 percent by 2014. Finally, there has been little change in the attribution of inequality to less in-born ability or a lack of motivation, with the former exceedingly unpopular, and the latter endorsed by about four out of 10 African Americans in recent years. Whites also showed a decline in endorsement of structural explanations of inequality (as well as the biological and cultural explanations), although lack of motivation and lack of access to education are the two most popular responses for whites.
Click to enlarge graph in new window
Interestingly, although the NORC question that seems to imply current discrimination as a cause of persistent inequality has enjoyed less support in recent years, in a related question—where the emphasis is on the lingering effects of slavery and discrimination—the percentage recognizing discrimination’s effects remains high (see Figure 7 (B) above). The most recent data—2012—reveal that nearly three out of four African Americans agree that “generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” African Americans’ support for this explanation has remained fairly consistent since the mid-1980s. However, over time, more African Americans agree with statements that put responsibility on African Americans to fix the problem. Close to 40 percent of African Americans agreed (“strongly” or “somewhat”) with the statement that blacks should try harder when the question was first asked in the mid-1980s, and that increased to a slight majority by 2012. During the same time period, more African Americans agreed with the statement that blacks should receive “no special favors.” (Note: Due to changes in the wording of the ISR questions on the effects of slavery and whether blacks should “try harder”, trend comparisons are based on the assumption that respondents would be proportionally distributed if the middle answer option of “neither agree nor disagree” was not offered in any year.)
Download detailed results
Questions Concerning Explanations for Inequality, White Respondents
(.xlsx, 38.37 KB)
Questions Concerning Explanations for Inequality, Black Respondents
(.xlsx, 38.33 KB)
White Attitudes
The slow but steady decline among whites for the discrimination explanation of inequality (see Explanations for Inequality section) is of significance, given its central role in shaping public opinion about racial policies. If whites do not perceive blacks as facing discrimination, then racial policies that are predicated on the notion that blacks continue to experience discrimination will likely fail in the court of public opinion. In a series of Gallup questions, respondents were asked whether blacks had “as good a chance” as whites to access jobs, housing and education. In the early 1960s, when the questions on education and jobs were first asked, whites were much more likely to report equal chances in education (94 percent in 1962) than in jobs (51 percent in 1963). Whites’ assessment of equal opportunities in jobs increased through the late 1990s until leveling off at just over three quarters in 2008. Over three quarters of whites responded they believe blacks have equal opportunity in housing and education from the late 1980s through the 2000s (housing range: 76 to 90 percent; education range: 80 to 90 percent). Whites have shown little change in their attitudes about the existence of equal opportunity in these important areas of social life for over two decades.
Click to enlarge graph in new window
A series of questions provided by the Gallup Poll tap white perceptions of discrimination in general (as opposed to its role in explaining racial inequality) beginning in the 1990s. Results from 1997 to 2007 show both little change over time, and relatively low levels of recognition that blacks are “treated less fairly” than whites in places like on the job, in neighborhood shops, downtown, in restaurants and by the police (see Figure 8 (W) above). In 2007, the percentage of whites who acknowledge discrimination against African Americans in public settings and employment generally ranges from 11 percent (in shops) to 15 percent (downtown and on the job). The only venue where a much higher percentage of whites perceive unfair treatment is by the police. In 2007, just over one in three whites reported they thought blacks were treated less fairly by the police. Between 1997 and 2007, there was a slight decline in recognition of unfair treatment across all of the venues included in the Gallup surveys except for the police, where the figures stayed relatively constant.
Black Attitudes
One of the key lessons from a series of Gallup questions about discrimination is the striking racial differences in the belief that African Americans face discrimination. For example, in 2008, a clear majority of African Americans believed that blacks did not have “as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job for which they are qualified.” Though declining slightly, this has been the modal response since the question was first asked in 1963. Whites, by contrast, are unlikely to acknowledge that blacks are treated unfairly: just over 20 percent in 2008 agreed with this statement. African Americans have consistently shown universal support for the principle of equal access in education, housing and jobs (see the Principles of Equality section), but since the 1960s and continuing until today, a majority or near-majority of African Americans have reported that blacks do not have the same chances as whites in these areas. Whites, on the other hand, reached near universal support for the principle of equal access over the last half of the twentieth century, but much lower levels of whites recognize persistent unequal treatment.
Click to enlarge graph in new window
Another set of questions asking whether blacks are treated unfairly in a range of settings (on the job, in neighborhood shops, downtown, in restaurants, and by the police) also show fairly widespread recognition among African Americans that whites and blacks are not treated equally. This ranges from a high of 76 percent who reported that blacks are treated less fairly by the police, to over one-half who said it was the case on the job, and between 33 percent and 53 percent who said blacks were treated less fairly in a variety of other public places. African Americans reported fairly consistent responses for each of these items over the course of the ten years the question was asked (1997 to 2007). Whites are much less likely to report discrimination against blacks in each of these venues. They are most likely to report racial discrimination in police interactions, which reflects the same pattern seen in African Americans’ responses. However, in 2007, only 36 percent of whites report that blacks are discriminated against by the police, while fully 76 percent of African Americans report that there is police-related discrimination against blacks. The same disparities exist for perceptions of discrimination in other areas of life (see Figure 8 (B) above).
Download detailed results
White Attitudes
Underlying the questions discussed in the Explanations of Inequality section (whether inequality is due to lack of motivation, less in-born ability, etc.) are the beliefs that people hold about the characteristics of racial groups—what are commonly referred to as racial stereotypes. Since 1990, national surveys have regularly included measures of this important dimension of racial attitudes; stereotype questions were included in much earlier time periods, but they generally disappeared from national surveys, likely due to increasing social pressures against reporting negative racial stereotypes and the reluctance to include them in surveys. But survey researchers responded by creating subtler measures including those reported here. Survey respondents are presented with a seven-point scale anchored on one end by a low status/negative trait (poor, lazy, and unintelligent) and the other by a high status/positive trait (rich, hardworking, and intelligent). They are first asked to rate whites as a group, and then in a separate question asked to rate blacks as a group. A difference score can then be calculated—a simple subtraction of the score they gave to whites and the score they gave to blacks. In the tables, we report the percentage of respondents who rate whites more positively, who rate no difference between whites and blacks, and who rate blacks more positively on each of these dimensions.
Click to enlarge graph in new window
The overall patterns for stereotypes show that between 1990 and 2004, there was a striking decline in the percentage of whites who report negative stereotypes of blacks. But after that point, the levels have remained constant (see Figure 9 (W) above). For example, in 1990, two out of three whites rated whites as harder-working than blacks; a percentage that declined steadily until 2004, when the figure was just about half that level (37 percent). From 2004 to 2014, though, the percentage of whites endorsing the stereotype ranged from a high of 42 percent in 2006 to a low of 34 percent in 2014. The belief that blacks are less intelligent than whites similarly declined from 57 percent in 1990 to just over one in four in 2004 and since then endorsement has stabilized at 23 to 27 percent. A note on the rich/poor dimension is called for. Given objective racial inequalities in income, the trait rating on rich/poor is not interpreted as a stereotype, but is included as a measure of the extent to which whites perceive racial inequality. In 2014 almost 70 percent of whites correctly perceive that whites, as a group, are richer than blacks.
On the one hand, these results about the declining use of stereotypes may provide some reason for optimism. Whites are less willing (in a survey interview) to draw sharp distinctions between racial groups on the traits of intelligence and laziness. However, caution is advised against making too much of these findings. First, social desirability pressures may be particularly at work on these kinds of items. It has become increasingly socially unacceptable to admit to believing in racial differences of this type, and thus surveys may under-estimate levels of stereotype endorsement. Indeed, evidence from laboratory studies of “unconscious” stereotyping suggest that stereotypes continue to shape how whites think about race and racial groups (Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell and Leibold, 2001). Second, qualitative studies on racial attitudes suggest that the traits being measured by NORC may not be tapping those most prevalent in the contemporary racial climate (e.g., Waters, 1999; Lamont, 2000). In other words, the intelligence question—though still revealing that one in four whites agrees that blacks as a group are less intelligent than whites—may tap a sentiment that is particularly prone to social desirability pressures because of the changing racial ideology away from an endorsement of “innate differences” such as intelligence and towards cultural deficiencies.
White Attitudes
Click to enlarge graph in new window
Click to enlarge graph in new window
Showing almost as much change over time as principles of racial equality (see the Principles of Equality section) are questions about the degree to which whites are willing to accept blacks into a range of social spheres. One of the most dramatic changes in the past twenty years has been in attitudes towards interracial marriage; although openness to interracial marriage has not reached levels of universal support, there have been striking changes (see Figure 10 (W) above). Several of the questions about social distance that were included in the early years of survey research on racial attitudes are no longer asked, mainly because few whites in the contemporary era will report that they object to minimal levels of integration (which were the focus of earlier questions). For example, by the mid-1990s whites were almost universally accepting of small numbers of black neighbors or classmates (see Figure 11 (W) above). Whites also showed slightly increasing acceptance of blacks comprising “half” or a “majority” of their children’s classmates.
Click to enlarge graph in new window
However, the patterns are different when the questions are about more than token integration. For example, beginning in 1990, NORC began asking whites how they would feel living in a neighborhood where “half of the neighbors” were black. Between 1990 and 2014 the percentage of whites who “opposed” or “strongly opposed” living in such a neighborhood dropped from 48 percent to 19 percent, with a plateau starting in the mid-2000s (see Figure 12 (W) above). To be sure, attitudes (as is typically the case) over-state actual behaviors; patterns of residential segregation demonstrate that few whites actually live in such neighborhoods and studies of whites’ housing choices reveal that whites are very likely to avoid just such diverse neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993). But these attitudinal data reveal that the trend is in the same direction as the patterns of actual residential segregation.
The same general conclusion about the similarity in trends in attitudes and behaviors is evident in the intimate sphere of marriage. On the one hand, opposition to inter-racial marriage dramatically declined from 67 percent in 1990 to 18 percent in 2014, according to a NORC question about approval of interracial marriage among family members. A similar question from Gallup about interracial marriage in general also shows a large decline in opposition: from 49 percent in 1991 to 14 percent in 2011. At the same time, although quite small, the percentages of actual interracial marriages in the U.S. have also increased over time; thus, the trends are similar between this attitudinal report and a behavioral manifestation. However, the levels of approval are far greater than the actual levels of interracial marriage.
Click to enlarge graph in new window
In a general question about social distance, whites were asked how close they feel to whites and then how close they feel to blacks. We calculate a difference score to identify the degree to which whites feel closer to other whites than they feel to blacks. Using this abstract question about closeness—related to, but not completely the same as, willingness to share social space—we see that there has also been some change over time: the percentage of whites who reported feeling closer to whites than they do to blacks dropped from 54 percent in 1996 to 42 percent in 2014 (see Figure 13 (W) above). This seems to match other trends that show a decrease in whites’ opposition to integration in various social settings, including intimate ones, like family.
Black Attitudes
Click to enlarge graph in new window
On the issue of preferred social distance from whites, there has always been almost universal acceptance of integration in the settings that have been asked about in surveys. Many of the questions on social distance, such as school racial composition and white dinner guests have not been replicated in recent years, likely due to the lack of variation. For instance, since they were first asked in the 1970s, African Americans have reported nearly universal support for sending their children to schools where a “few” to “half” of their classmates are white (see Figure 10 (B) above). However, two questions—one on housing and one on interracial marriage—have been asked in recent years and are most useful as counterpoints to the results reported for whites’ preferred social distance. Just as African Americans have opposed laws against interracial marriage, they also report quite low levels of opposition to interracial marriage (see Figure 9 (B) above). In 2014, just 6 percent were “opposed” to a close relative or family member marrying a white person. The Gallup version of this question shows a decline from about one in four blacks objecting in 1972, to only 3 percent in 2014 (see also the Principles of Equality section).
Click to enlarge graph in new window
A question in which blacks were asked if they would oppose living in a neighborhood that was half white shows very little opposition to such a neighborhood—just 10 percent either somewhat or strongly opposed this in 2014. It is worth noting that the comparison figure for whites—those who would be opposed to living in a half-black neighborhood, for example, was 19 percent—or about twice as many (see Figure 11 (B) above).
Click to enlarge graph in new window
One additional social distance question asks blacks how close they feel to whites and how close they feel to blacks. In the table, we report the differences that blacks report in their levels of closeness to whites and blacks. To be sure, a higher percentage of blacks report being closer to blacks than whites; interestingly, there has been a decline in this sentiment—and a corresponding increase in the percentage of African Americans who report feeling no difference in their closeness to whites and blacks (see Figure 12 (B) above). In 2014, half of blacks said they feel closer to blacks than whites; this is down from the high of 62 percent in 1996. Whites reported a similar decrease in closeness to whites in favor of reporting “no difference” in closeness. In 2014, 46 percent of African Americans and 53 percent of whites report “no difference.”
Download detailed results
Questions Concerning Social Distance, White Respondents
(.xlsx, 46.75 KB)
Questions Concerning Social Distance, Black Respondents
(.xlsx, 35.49 KB)
White Attitudes
There are a small group of miscellaneous questions that are all of interest, but not easy to fit into the other categories of questions we have presented. Some of them are also challenging to interpret, due to the ambiguity of the wording and the changing historical context.
Related to the question of closeness (see the Social Distance section), there is a longer time series in which whites are asked to evaluate their feelings toward whites and blacks on what is called a “feeling thermometer”—where zero is “cold” and 100 is “warm.” Whites, on average, report consistently cooler feelings toward blacks than toward whites. Though the means have fluctuated over time, the difference in ratings has decreased over time, as whites have reported cooler feelings towards other whites. When the question was first asked in 1964, whites’ feelings were 25 degrees cooler towards African Americans than whites, while in 2008 whites’ feelings were about 7 degrees cooler toward African Americans.
Click to enlarge graph in new window
Similarly, whites have increasingly rejected the idea that “blacks shouldn’t push themselves where they’re not wanted.” In 1963, only 22 percent of whites disagreed (“strongly and slightly”) with this statement, and in 2002, this figure was up to 62 percent, almost three times as many respondents (see Figure 14 (W) above). This also supports the trends we discussed in the section on social distance, which seem to show a decrease in whites’ opposition to integration in their social lives. That having been said, there is a ‘resentfulness’ that is implied by this question (see Wilson 2011) and thus it is noteworthy that nearly 40 percent of whites continued to agree with this statement when the question was last asked in 2002.
Black Attitudes
There are a small group of miscellaneous questions that are all of interest, but not easy to fit into the other categories of questions we have presented. Some of them are also challenging to interpret, due to the ambiguity of the wording and the changing historical context.
Related to the question of closeness (see the Social Distance section), there is a longer time series in which African Americans are asked to evaluate their feelings toward whites and blacks on what is called a “feeling thermometer”—where 0 is “cold” and 100 is “warm.” African Americans, on average, report consistently cooler feelings toward whites than blacks. As was the case with whites, there has not been significant change in the thermometer ratings that African Americans give to blacks and whites; in 2008, the means were 86 and 77, respectively. This is fairly consistent throughout the time series, although there does seem to be a slight increase in African Americans’ ratings of warmth towards whites. The gap between the two average ratings is therefore decreasing; in 1964 there was a 24 degree difference, and in 2008 it was a 9 degree difference. The convergence of these thermometer ratings is similar to whites (25 degree difference in 1964 and 7 degree difference in 2008).
Click to enlarge graph in new window
Finally, a majority of African Americans have consistently rejected the idea that “blacks shouldn’t push themselves where they are not wanted.” In 1980, 54 percent of African Americans disagreed (“strongly and slightly”) with this statement, and in 2002, this figure was up to 74 percent (See Figure 13 (B) above). In contrast, fewer whites initially expressed disagreement (1963 - 22 percent; 1980 - 32 percent), but by 2002, 62 percent of whites rejected the idea that “blacks shouldn’t push themselves where they are not wanted.”
Download detailed results
Miscellaneous Questions, White Respondents
(.xlsx, 34.38 KB)
Miscellaneous Questions, Black Respondents
(.xlsx, 33.42 KB)
Maria Krysan is a professor in the Institute of Government and Public Affairs and department head of Sociology at the University of Illinois at Chicago. She is a co-author of the book upon which this website is based, "Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretation, 2nd Edition." Her research focuses on racial attitudes and racial residential segregation and her investigations of these substantive issues often connect to methodological questions about how to study this sensitive area of social life. She combines standard closed-ended survey analysis with mode of administration experiments, analyses of open-ended survey questions, focus groups, and in-depth interviews. Her work has been funded by the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, Russell Sage Foundation, and Ford Foundation. Her most recent work focuses on understanding the causes of residential segregation, particularly as viewed through the question of how people end up living where they do.
Sarah Patton Moberg is a doctoral student in the Sociology Department at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Her research interests include economic inequality, labor market stratification by race and gender, and the organization of work. She completed her Masters degree in Summer 2016 with the paper, "A Piece of the Inequality Puzzle: An Analysis of the Part-time Labor Force in the Postindustrial United States (1976-2015)."
Berinsky, A. (1999). The Two Faces of Public Opinion. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 1209-30.
Bobo, L., Kluegel, J. R., & Smith, R. A. (1997). Laissez-Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler, Antiblack Ideology. In S. A. Tuch & J. K. Martin (Eds.), Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and Change (15-41). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Bobo, L., & Kluegel, J. R. (1993). Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitudes? American Sociological Review, 58, 443-464.
Bonilla-Silva, E., & Forman T. (2000). ‘I’m Not a Racist, But...’: Mapping White College Students’ Racial Ideology in the USA. Discourse and Society, 11(1), 50-85.
Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 1013-1027.
Forman, T. (2004). Color-Blind Racism and Racial Indifference: The Role of Racial Apathy in Facilitating Enduring Inequalities. In M. Krysan and A. Lewis (Eds.), The Changing Terrain of Race and Ethnicity (43-66). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Henry, P. J. & Sears, D. O. (2002). The Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale. Political Psychology, 23, 253-283.
Kinder, D. R. & Sanders, L. M. (1996). Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Krysan, M. (1999). “Qualifying a Quantifying Analysis on Racial Equality.” Social Psychology Quarterly, 62(2), 211-218.
Lamont, M. (2000). The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration. New York and Cambridge: Russell Sage Foundation and Harvard University Press.
Massey, D. S., & Denton, N. (1993). American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McConahay, J. (1986). Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale. In J. F. Dovidio and S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
McConnell, A. & Leibold, J. (2001). Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37(5) 435-42.
Schuman, H., Steeh, C., Bobo, L., & Krysan, M. (1997). Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations (Rev. ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Waters, M. C. (1999). Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Wilson, D. C., & Davis, D. W. (2011). “Reexamining Racial Resentment: Conceptualization and Content.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 634(1), 117-133.